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PREFACE
The history of psycholinguistics, as with most sciences, has
been marked by false starts, dead ends, and seemingly fruitless
avenues of research.

OVer a period of time, several theories of

language processing and language learning have been offered only to
be discarded in the light of discrepant data and unexplained
linguistic phenomena.

However, it is neither the intention nor within

the scope of the present paper to discuss all of the historical
foundations for the present state of psycholinguistic research.

The

historical background for language studies is discussed only as it
relates to the development of a transformational model of generative
grammar.
Prior to any consideration of language as the object of
scientific research, the format of the present paper must be delineated.
Firstly, a short history of scientific language study will be presented.
Secondly, linguistics will be treated in terms of the development of a
transformational model of generative grammar according to Chomsky's
standard theory.

Thirdly, the basic distinctions between linguistic

competence and performance will be delineated, and the concepts of
deep and surface structure defined.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Throughout its long history, linguistics has been claimed as
the stepchild of many disciplines:

philosophy, rhetoric, philology,

history, and only very recently psychology.

As far back as the ancient

Greeks, questions were raised concerning the relationship between an
object and its verbal description.

The study of language continued to

be of interest because of its apparent specifically human characteristic, and as such was approached from a variety of directions.
Depending on the assumptions made about the nature of language,
various schools of linguistic research developed.

From the standpoint

of philosophy, language was treated as an introspective phenomenon
whose essential nature was only discoverable from the self-reports of
the individual.

As such, language study was constrained by the

parameters of memory limitations, forgetting, and stimulus-cue
generalization.

In short, an understanding of language was only as

accurate as the person reporting the data.
History and Development
The scientific approach to language was first developed by
Bloomfield and the structuralist schools of linguistics.

The

fundamental distinction in theory between form and meaning, or
structure and content, originally formulated by De Saussure, was
accepted by the structuralists.

Language was then to be investigated
1
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as a formal structure separable from meaning or content.

This

theoretical clarification served to separate the study of language
from the less-objective approaches of philosophy.
The principal aim of the structuralist school was to develop
a methodology for the discovery of the basic units of language, which
method was called constituent analysis.

These units were to be

considered in their objective structural form without consideration
of the cognitive or mental contents underlying them.

The basic

language components were specified as minimal sound units, termed
phonemes, and minimal syntactic units, termed morphemes.

By describ-

ing the units of language structure and the syntactic combination of
these units, the linguist was able to derive the grammar of the
language under investigation.
By definition, then, the structural or taxonomic linguist dealt
with the formal structure of language.

The linguist analyzed objective

language utterances and attempted to identify and classify the
structures and rules of combination and ordering.
Late in the 1950's another discipline was emerging which
combined linguistics and psychology called psycholinguistics--the
study of the language-user (cf. Osgood & Sebeok, 1965).

As Hormann

(1970) stated, the object of this psycholinguistics was not to describe
language as a formal structure but to describe the process of language
use.

Psycholinguistics, then, viewed psychology as a natural and

necessary partner to linguistics.
About this same time the linguist Noam Chomsky presented a

b
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different approach to linguistic analysis called Transformational
Generative Grammar.

This approach accepted the basic form-content

distinction from the structuralist school.

But Chomsky (1957) began

a revolution in language study by formulating the goal of linguistics
as description and explanation of the linguistic intuitions of a
native speaker-hearer.

He hypothesized a deductive model of grammar

for an idealized speaker-hearer, from a totally homogeneous language
community, who knew and used perfectly the rules of grammar.
Chomsky attempted, then, not only to describe the particular
linguistic data, but also to explain the descriptions in terms of a
universal grammar.

In 1965, he formally presented the Standard Theory

of transformational generative grammar.

This model proposed to provide

a structural description for all, and only all possible sentences
gramatically acceptable to a native speaker-hearer of English.

In 1972,

Chomsky developed the Extended Standard Theory of transformational
grammar which incorporated some of the subtle semantic data which could
not be handled by the original theory.
This new direction in linguistic investigation was soon influential in the psychological research on language.

Miller first

brought Chomsky to the attention of the psychological community.

He

presented the results of the first experimental studies of sentences
based on a transformational model of syntactic structure.

The results

were consistent with two of Chomsky's theoretical axioms.

The first

was that the sentence was not merely a combination of words and
associations, but rather that "the structure of the sentence contrib-

4

utes as much to its interpretation as its elements.

Therefore, the

understanding of the sentence could not be expected as a by-product
of the study of the word" (Gough, 1971, p. 255).

Prior work by

psychologists (cf. Gough & Jenkins, 1963) had dealt almost exclusively
with the word, its related properties of meaning associations, and its
role in memory and perception.

The second was Chomsky's demonstration

that sentence comprehension and production was a species of rulegoverned behavior (Greene, p. 11, p. 19).
As described by Gough (1971) transformational grammar ascribed
to every sentence a number of properties:

degree of grammaticality,

surface and deep structure, and transformational complexity.

These

properties were hypothesized to be not only linguistic constructs,
but in some sense, psychological realities.

A succession of

psychological studies examined the effects of these properties.

Early

research had shown that grammatical sequences of words are both
perceived more easily and also memorized more readily than a randomly
ordered sequence of words (Miller, Heise, & Lichten, 1951; Miller &
Selfridge, 1956).

Later, degrees of grammatical well-formedness were

shown to be related to the ease with which sentences could be repeated
(Epstein, 1961), memorized (Marks & Miller, 1964) or paraphrased
(Downey & Hakes, 1968).

Clifton and Odom (1966) found that perceived

similarity between sentences was related to the differences in
transformational complexity between the sentences.
The above research delineated the importance of syntactic
structure and Chomsky has been further responsible for much of the

5

current interest in language comprehension, long-term storage of
sentences, depth of comprehension, and retrieval of stored linguistic
inferences.
constructs
Competence and performance.

A key concept in the theory of

chomsky was that of the distinction between competence and performance.
Basically competence refers to what a native speaker-hearer knows of
his language, and performance to how he uses it.

While the concept of

performance is fairly straightforward, that of competence is not.
Lenneberg (1967) suggested that part of the difficulty lay in the misuse
of the word "grammar."

Grammar has alternatively referred to an abstract

linguistic model of grammatical rules and to an internalized set of
these rules and their actual use in sentence comprehension and production.
The abstract model of grammar was a linguistic grammar which
generated structural descriptions for all and only all the sentences of
a language.

This model proposed to describe and explain an idealized

speaker-hearer's competence or knowledge of grammar.

The idealized

speaker-hearer was hypothesized to possess perfect intuition about the
grammaticality of sentences in the language.

Chomsky himself best

summarized the nature of this type of competence model.

"A generative

grammar as it stands is no more a model of the speaker than it is a
model of the hearer.

Rather ••• it can be regarded only as a

characterization of the intrinsic tacit knowledge or competence that
underlies actual performance" (1965, p. 140).

••
6

The linguistic data for this model were the possible, grammatically well-formed sentences of an idealized speaker-hearer.

These

sentences were described in terms of the linguistic constructs:
generative syntactic phrase-structure and transformational rules, and
interpretive semantic and phonological rules.

This model of grammati-

cal competence projected no claim about the actual use of the rules
of grammar by the native speaker-hearer, nor were its data the
sentences of language as actually produced by a particular speaker.
The second concept of grammatical competence, internalized
rules, and their actual use, described something more than the abstract
knowledge of grammar of an idealized speaker-hearer.

Somehow, an

actual native speaker-hearer had mastered and organized a grammar in
a manner similar to the idealized competence model.

In this second

sense, grammar competence became a performance variable in actual
language use.
Part of the problem in understanding the competence model has
been in failing to distinguish the two understandings of grammatical
competence.

Chomsky has on many occasions disclaimed the notion that

the competence model in any way described the actual process of
sentence production or comprehension.

Yet he seems also to have on

occasion implicitly argued for the internalized competence model in
actual comprehension and production of sentences (Chomsky, 1965, p. 8;
1972a, p. 116).
Fodor and Garrett (1966) attempted to clarify the situation by
formally specifying the two ways in which competence may be understood •

....
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The first understanding was that of competence as a formalization of
a speaker-hearer's grammatical information.

In this sense competence

is not to be confused with behavior, where behavior is the corpus of
actual linguistic experience indicative of the speaker-hearer's
grammatical knowledge.
The second type of competence referred to the speaker-hearer's
linguistic capacity which interacts with other mechanisms in the
production of verbalizations.

This competence includes knowledge

of the language, and the psychological processes which interact with
this knowledge.

This second type of competence was termed internalized

competence and although rejected by Fodor and Garrett, it represented
the closest link to a possible performance model of grammar.
In addition to changing the relationship between the understanding of competence and performance, the notion of internalized
competence necessarily changed the data base for its grammatical
model.

Because the production component had become such a large part

of the model, the idealized speaker-hearer was no longer an adequate
source for the linguistic rules.

The rules had to be derived on the

basis of the actual linguistic productions of the native speaker.
Performance, then, became an important component of the inferred
internalized grammar of the actual speaker-hearer.

A definition of

actual performance, however, has been difficult to specify because it
involves so many different processes in the actual native speakerhearer.

This includes all those cognitive processes underlying the

production and comprehension of sentences, such as perception, storage,

8

and retrieval.
Lenneberg (1967) defined performance in terms of the extralinguistic beliefs of the speaker-hearer and the cognitive principles
mentioned above.

Performance was presented as a perceptual model

and Lenneberg challenged psychologists to define the parameter of this
model.
Fodor and Garrett (1966) took a different tack in the discussion
of linguistic performance.

Performance was conceived as the behavioral

manifestation of the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his grammar.

In

this context, the nature of the linguistic knowledge is inferred and
formalized from observable behavior and is seen as entirely separate
from the model of abstract competence.
Understood in this way, the psychological relationship between
competence and performance was amenable to experimental study.
Deep and surface structure.

Equally as fundamental to an

understanding of the transformational generative grammar model was
the distinction between deep and surface structure.

The surface

structure of a sentence was defined as the final perceptual form of

·[

the sentence.

This level contained the final sequence and arrangement

of words, generated by syntactic rules, and interpreted by the
semantic and phonological rules of the grammar.
The deep structure of the sentence was defined as the abstract
syntactic structure which specified the underlying syntactic structures
and their relationships necessary for an interpretation of the sentence.
Deep structure categories and relations determined the final organizations

b
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and sequencing of linguistic elements in the final surface structure.
Chomsky (1972) used the following example to illustrate this
surface--deep structure distinction:
visible world."

"Invisible God created the

The sentence level which is composed of the sound

signal corresponds to the surface level.

However, underlying the

form of this sentence three propositions are hypothesized:

that

God is invisible, that he created the world, and that the world is

visible.

The three propositions interrelate to form the deep

structure.
A further example of this distinction is the following:
process which Tom, who you know, described failed.
surface structure.

The

This is the final

According to Chomsky's theoretical model, a

basic structure was hypothesized as underlying the surface structure;
i.e., The process failed.
sentenc~

However, embedded within the surface

were two other hypothesized sentences:

process, and You know Tom.

II.

Tom described the

These hypothesized underlying sentences

were then mapped into the surface structure through such transformational operations as addition, deletion, and substitution.
The distinction between the deep_and surface structure of
sentences, and the competence and performance of speaker-hearers are
of theoretical interest if one is to establish cognitive universals
of linguistic analysis.

The psycholinguist asks the question:

does the native speaker-hearer know about his language?

What

He wants to

establish as a psychological reality the basic cognitive principles
underlying knowledge of a grammar.

If the concepts of deep and

10
surface structure are viable principles of cognition, then the
individual knows more about his language than is evident from the
perceptual sentence output.

The deep and surface structure dis-

tinction should reveal empirical differences in sentence processing.

CHAPTER II
LINGUISTIC PROCESSING OF AMBIGUOUS SENTENCES
Ambiguous Sentences:

A Definition

The ambiguous sentence has been hypothesized as one grammatical
structure which could be useful in empirically demonstrating the
psychological validity of deep and surface structure and perhaps
clarifying the competence-performance distinction.

Ambiguity may

be defined as a set of stimulus patterns, in this case the sentence
constituents, which admits of two or more interpretations.
Ambiguity may arise from the deep or surface structure of a
sentence in more than one way.

Ambiguity in the surface structure is

resolved by any simple rearrangement of the constituents.

Resolution

of the ambiguity does not involve complex analysis of the underlying
syntactic or semantic relations.

An example of ambiguity in the

surface structure is the following:
were sailing south.

The three masted British ships

Segmentation of the sentence before the word

three suggests that an unspecified number of British ships with three
masts sailed south.

Segmenting the sentence after the word three

suggests that three British ships with an unspecified number of masts
sailed south.

The two interpretations underlying the ambiguous

sentence were derived from the same surface structure constituents.
Although the ambiguity is found in the surface structure, it is the
underlying syntactic relationship of the adjective three to the noun
11
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phrase constituent of the sentence that determines the position of
the segmentation.
The resolution of deep structure ambiguity involves more than
simply rearranging the surface structure components.
deep structure ambiguity is the following:
hunters was terrible.

An example of

The shooting of the

A simple rearrangement or segmentation of the

surface structure cannot resolve the ambiguity.

What is implied in

this sentence is a more complex relationship of the gerund shooting
to the prepositional phrase of the hunters.

Either the hunters are

the object of the shooting (the hunters were the ones who were shot)
or the hunters themselves did the shooting.

Because the implied

relation between the gerund and prepositional phrase is one of actor
or acted upon, this type of ambiguity is termed deep structure
syntactic ambiguity.

Appendix A contains the tree diagrams

illustrating the underlying syntactic relations.
Another type of ambiguity may be termed lexical ambiguity.
This type of ambiguity focuses on the semantic referent of a surface
structure constituent.
the tank.
tank.

In the following sentence:

The soldier filled

the ambiguity lies in the lexical referent of the word

Again, a segmentation of the surface structure constituents

does not resolve the ambiguity in the sentence, nor does a specification
of the syntactic relations.

Only when the lexical referent of the

noun phrase is determined can the possible interpretations of the
sentence be resolved.

In the above sentence, the word tank can refer

to a receptacle for liquids, or it can refer to a portable military

13

weapons system.
In summary, there are two types of ambiguity, syntactic and
lexical.

Syntactic ambiguity may arise in the surface structure or

in the underlying deep structure.

Lexical ambiguity arises in the

specification of the referent of a word or constituent in the
sentence.
Review of Research
In recent years, much psycholinguistic research has been
directed toward the psychological processes involved in the understanding of ambiguous sentences.
follows:

The research will be reviewed as

1) reasons for studying ambiguous sentences; 2) a discussion

of the empirical definitions of ambiguity; 3) the use of perception
time as a methodology for studying ambiguity; 4) bias as a factor in
ambiguity resolution; 5) the postulating of a linguistic processing
hypothesis; 6) the importance of prior experimental cueing for the
comprehension of ambiguity; and 7) a summary.
Experimental rationale and definition.

Empirical study of

ambiguous sentence processing is of interest for two reasons.

Firstly,

Cairns (1973) stated that many, if not all, fully processed unambiguous
sentences are ambiguous prior to their conclusion, and if the psycholinguistic processes associated with the ambiguous sentences can be
discovered, then inference into the day-to-day comprehension of nonambiguous linguistic input can be made.

Secondly, the study of

ambiguous sentence processing may provide insights into the psychological
aspects of the deep and surface dichotomy, and perhaps reveal something

14
of abstract sentence processing hypothesized for all language
performance.
In general, however, psycholinguistic research has failed to
specify how a native speaker-hearer interprets and understands the
possible interpretations associated with the ambiguous sentence.
Gleason (1965) stated that previous research failed to specify an
adequate operational definition of ambiguity and as a result the
interpretation of some of the experimental results has been tenuous.
In rectifying this problem, MacKay and Bever (1967) empirically
defined sentence ambiguity as any stimulus pattern which is capable
of two and only two distinct interpretations.

Ambiguous sentences

can have more than two meanings, but limiting the sentences to only
two interpretations has the effect of permitting the

~

to make more

accurate inferences about the cognitive comprehension process.

If

only two meanings are possible, direct comparisons can be made
between the experimental sentences.
MacKay and Bever (1967) empirically defined one type of
ambiguity as syntactic ambiguity in the surface structure of the
sentence.

This level was represented by the various ways in which

the same sentence could be segmented to yield more than one meaning.

An example of such sentence ambiguity is the following:
masted British ships were sailing south.

The three

(as discussed on page 11).

A second type of ambiguity was related to the underlying, or
syntactic deep structure of the sentence.

The underlying syntactic

relation between constituents was the locus of the ambiguity.

An

I

b
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example is the sentence:

The shooting of the hunters was terrible.

(as described on page 12 and schematically diagramed in Appendix A.)
A third type of ambiguity was empirically defined as semantic
or lexical ambiguity.

As stated on page 12 this type of ambiguity

involves ambiguity in the lexical referent of a word or words in the
sentence.

An example of this type of ambiguity is the following:

The soldier filled the tank.
MacKay and Bever (1967) also described a more complex type of
ambiguity.

These sentences involve a combination of both surface

syntactic structure and semantic referent ambiguity.

An example of

a sentence which is ambiguous in both lexical referent and syntactic
surface structure is the following:

He unclogged the pipe in the

bathroom.

Ambiguity arises from uncertainty about the meaning of the

word

and the surface structure segmentation of the constituents.

~'

Should the major break come after unclogged or pipe?
~

is being referred to in the above sentence?

taken to the bathroom and cleaned or was the

~

What type of

Also, was the

~

already a part of

the bathroom and cleaned?
Perception time.

Among the various methods used to measure

linguistic processing of ambiguous sentences, perception time (PT)
has been most frequently and successfully utilized.

Perception time

was defined as the latency between the presentation of the ambiguous
sentence and the S's resolution of the ambiguity.

MacKay (1966) used

a sentence completion task with perception time as a means of measuring
ambiguity comprehension.

In the completion task, the Ss were given

16
ambiguous sentence fragments and required to complete them.

The time

to complete each fragment was defined as the perception time.
found increasing processing time in the following order:

MacKay

unambiguous

sentences, lexical ambiguity, surface structure ambiguity, and finally
underlying syntactic ambiguity.
Using a different type of task, MacKay and Bever (1967) found
perception time to be a function of the type of ambiguity.
study

~s

sentence.

In this

were asked to search for the second meaning of the ambiguous
Perception time for lexical ambiguity was shorter than for

the sentences involving surface structure ambiguity.

The longest

perception times were found in the sentences which involved syntactic
deep structure ambiguity.
Mistler-Lachman (1972), however, found a different relationship between the perception times for the various types of ambiguity.
Her study employed three types of ambiguity and five types of response
tasks.

The five tasks were:

1) comprehension for meaningfulness

without context; 2) comprehension for meaningfulness with context;
3) comprehension for context integration; 4) comprehension for
production without context; and 5) comprehension for production with
context.

The first task required the

~

to judge whether a target

sentence was meaningful or not without the presentation of context.
The second task required the S to make the same meaningfulness judgment
with the addition of context preceding the target sentence.
task required the
the context given.

b

~

The third

to judge whether the target sentence followed from
The fourth and fifth tasks required the

~

to make

17
up a sentence which would follow the target sentence.

Ss were told

that their sentence should follow reasonably from the target sentence.
In the fourth task the production was made without preceding context,
and in the fifth task preceding context was provided.

The Ss were

told that they need not necessarily use the context in the production
of their sentence.
For the purpose of the present study, the meaningfulness task
without context is most relevant.

Meaningfulness judgment was defined

as the judgment of whether a sentence was meaningful or nonsense.

In

this task, the latency was measured from the time the sentence was
visually presented to the time when the

~

had completed a judgment.

Mistler-Lachman (1972) found no significant differences in the
latencies meaningfulness judgments for the different categories of
ambiguity.
Ambiguous sentences:

Bias.

As a variable of study, biased

meanings of ambiguous sentences have been hypothesized to affect
perception time.

In general, meaning bias is defined as the S's

preference for one meaning over another in an ambiguous sentence.

The

higher the preference for one meaning, the greater the likelihood that
this meaning will be perceived first or solely in the resolution of
the ambiguity.

Although the above definition is generally applicable,

Es have defined bias according to the demands of the experiment.
Defining bias as the percent of Ss in a pre-study who reported
seeing one of the meanings first, MacKay and Bever (1967) found that
longer PTs were obtained when the first interpretation seen by the

~
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was the less biased meaning.

This relationship was especially noted

in underlying syntactic structure ambiguity.

PT was also greater for

lexical and surface ambiguities, when one of the meanings of the
sentence was more probable.

The longer PT was found, however, regard-

less of whether the more or less probable meaning was seen first.
Mehler and Carey (1968) used subject expectation as a definition
of bias.

Ss were given 11 specially prepared pictures followed by 11

sentences presented through earphones.

The S was to mechanically

indicate by flipping a switch whether each sentence was true or false
with respect to the picture.

The sentences were either a predicate

nominative construction or a transitive verb construction.

For one-

half of the Ss 10 of the sentences were a predicate nominative
construction, e.g., They are performing monkeys., followed by a sentence
containing a transitive verb, e.g., They are bombarding cities.

The

other half of the Ss received 10 transitive verb constructions
followed by a predicate nominative.

The results showed that processing

latencies for true sentences containing an unexpected surface structure
were longer than for sentences with an expected structure.
Carey, Mehler, and Bever (1970) used the same definition of
expectation as above with a picture verification task.

Ss were

auditorily preset to expect a sentence with either a predicate
nominative or transitive verb construction followed by an ambiguous
sentence of the type:

They are lecturing doctors.

I
''

Pictures which

made one of the meanings of the sentences true or false, followed the
sentences.

The results showed that Ss who heard the ambiguous materials
I'

I

b
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as consistent with the preset structure had latencies equal to those
of non-ambiguous sentences.

Ss who heard the ambiguous sentence as

being inconsistent with the preset structure showed longer latencies
than

~s

who had been set for the reading they heard.
Cairns (1973) pre-experimentally defined bias as the proportion

of a sample of Ss who perceived a particular meaning of a sentence.

A

sentence may have an 80% bias if 80% of the Ss perceived one meaning
of an ambiguous sentence.

Sixteen lexically ambiguous sentences were

presented with a second sentence which served to disambiguate the
first.

The results showed that highly biased ambiguous sentences

associated with unexpected sentences had longer latencies than unambiguous sentences paired with unexpected sentences.

Pairs containing

highly biased ambiguous sentences paired with expected sentences
resulted in the same latencies as for unambiguous sentences paired
with expected sentences.
In summary, from the above studies perception time seems a
reliable response variable to measure the complexity of linguistic

'I

,l,i
\II

I,

1.1,

processing.

Perception time has been used to study the effect of

ambiguity and bias on processing.

On the assumption that perception

time reflects a portion of cognitive functioning, valid hypotheses
were derived concerning ambiguous sentence comprehension.
Linguistic processing hypothesis.

Foss, Bever, and Silver

(1968) postulated three distinct comprehension processes employed by
the

~

when confronted with ambiguous sentence interpretation.

Model

I hypothesized that the native speaker-hearer analyzes all possible

illl. :I
iii

r

'

l
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interpretations of the ambiguous sentence and then chooses from among
these interpretations the one most appropriate.

Model II hypothesized

that sentence interpretation is withheld until further information or
context is provided allowing a single interpretation.

Model III held

that Ss tend to assign one meaning to a sentence until further information allows a different interpretation.

Using a picture

verification task the results of the study showed that verification
time was not significantly different for ambiguous or non-ambiguous
sentences.

Verification time was defined as time taken by the S to

state whether or not a picture supported an interpretation of an
ambiguous sentence.

These results suggested that Ss first assigned

one meaning to a sentence thus supporting Model III.
The "one-meaning hypothesis" implies that only one meaning of
an ambiguous sentence is comprehended (cf. Carey, Mehler, & Bever,
1970).

Studies manipulating bias have presented some support for a

single meaning hypothesis.

MacKay and Bever (1967) found longer PTs

when the first interpretation seen by the S was the less probable.

I.

If

two interpretations had been processed and simultaneously available,
no effect would have been noted for bias.

The fact that a less probable

meaning increases latency suggests that both interpretations were not
immediately available.

Using

~expectation

as a type of bias, Mehler

,,,I
II··\.

!i!

and Carey (1968) further demonstrated that processing latencies for
true sentences containing an unexpected surface structure were longer
than for true sentences with an expected structure.
hypothesis was inconsistent with these data.

A two meaning

I
'I,.
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cairns (1971) however, questioned the generality of the onem~aning

hypothesis.

She tested both lexically and syntactically

ambiguous sentences, each highly biased toward one meaning.

Cairns

(l971, 1973) had pre-experimentally defined sentence bias as the
percentage of Ss who perceived a particular meaning of a sentence.
ss were presented with pairs of sentences (1971).

The first was

lexically or syntactically ambiguous and the second was not.

The S

was to judge whether the second sentence was compatible with the
ambiguous sentence meanings by pushing a

~

or

~

button.

To explain the process Cairns (1971) hypothesized the operation
of a Language Comprehension Device (LCD} which is a type of cognitive
organization capable of comprehending all and only all of the sentences
produced by the language grammar.

If the LCD were operative for all

levels of ambiguity then an increasing latency should reflect the
reprocessing technique necessary in the compatibility judgment if the
~comprehended

both meanings of the ambiguous sentence.

The results

of the compatibility judgment showed an increased latency time only
for the lexically ambiguous sentences, but not for the syntactically
ambiguous sentences.

Consequently, the LCD was hypothesized to be

capable of simultaneously computing and analyzing two interpretations
for the biased syntactically ambiguous sentences.

However, the two

meanings of the lexically ambiguous sentences were hypothesized to be
analyzed immediately upon receipt by the LCD in succession rather than
in a parallel manner.
To further investigate this latter hypothesis Cairns (1973}
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presented the Ss with 16 lexically ambiguous sentences and a second
s~ntence

which served to disambiguate the first.

One-half of the

ambiguous sentences were highly biased and the other half were
relatively unbiased.

Four types of sentence pairs were constructed:

a) a pair in which Sl was ambiguous and S2 disambiguated the first
according to the expected (more probable) meaning of the ambiguity;
b) one in which the ambiguous Sl was disambiguated by S2 according
to its unexpected (less probable) meaning; c) a control pair in which
Sl was minimally altered to express unambiguously the more probable
meaning and conjoined to the expected S2; and d) a control pair in
which Sl was minimally altered to express unambiguously the less
probable meaning and conjoined with the unexpected second sentence
~.

338).

As in the earlier study, each S was to decide whether the

two sentences of the pair went together by pushing a yes or no button.
The results of the 1973 study showed that highly biased ambiguous
sentences associated with unexpected sentences had longer latencies
than unambiguous sentences paired with unexpected sentences.
similar effect was not found for the unbiased sentences.

A

Pairs

containing highly biased ambiguous sentences paired with expected
sentences revealed the same latencies as for similar unambiguous
sentences.
Cairns then hypothesized two processing stages intervening
between the end of the second sentence and the button pushing of the
judgment task.

The first stage was hypothesized to be a matching

stage during which the

\

h

~

compared the two sentences by some sort of
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matching strategy.

During the second stage or report stage the

~

used the information from the first stage and made a compatibility
judgment concerning the two sentences.

A third stage or reprocessing

stage was hypothesized to occur when the matching operation not only
yielded a mismatch but also a misperception of the ambiguity in the
first sentence.

This stage, which was hypothesized to occur between

the matching and report stage, involved a computation of a second,
compatible meaning.
Summary.

Previous studies have attempted to specify the

processes underlying sentence comprehension.

Various experimental

designs have been proposed as ways of determining the relative influence of deep and surface structure.

Two of the more important

methods in the study of sentence processing have been the use of
perception and verification latencies with ambiguous sentences.
MacKay (1966) found increasing perception time with increasing
complexity of ambiguity.

Foss (1970b) used a phoneme-monitor task

to investigate the effect of ambiguity on sentence comprehension.

He

found that reaction time was slower following the ambiguous material.
Other studies (cf. Cairns, 1971, 1973; Carey, Mehler, & Bever,
1970; Foss, Bever, & Silver, 1970) have found that bias and S
expectancy result in longer processing latencies.

Mistler-Lachman

(1972) found that with certain tasks, underlying structural ambiguity
has shown the longest latencies when compared with other types of
ambiguity.
The relationship between latency and levels of ambiguity has
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served to verify empirically a psycholinguistic model of deep and
surface structure processing.

It has also led to the development

of several models of linguistic processing and different cognitive
structuring (e.g., Language Comprehension Device} which specifically
dealt with the language function.
However, several important considerations have not been fully
accounted for by previous studies.

Firstly, Mistler-Lachman stated

that previous studies failed to control for levels of comprehension.
In the meaningfulness judgment the

~

was told to imagine a situation

in which the presented sentence might mean something.

The meaning-

fulness judgment alone was found to be inadequate for the study of
deep level comprehension of ambiguous sentences since the Ss were
not required to process the meaning of the entire sentence.
What, then, might be a task which not only requires the S to
judge the meaningfulness of the sentence, but also actively to
interpret the meaning of the sentence?
the

~

A procedure which would force

actively to search for a meaning or meanings of a sentence could

eliminate the shallowness of comprehension noted by Mistler-Lachman
(1972).

The shallowness was said to result from the failure to fully

comprehend the meaning of the sentence.
Secondly, previous research has not specified sublevels of
semantic ambiguity.

Specifically, those studies which have tested for

the processing of lexical ambiguity have not distinguished between
simple and complex lexical ambiguity.

In MacKay and Bever (1967)

simple lexical ambiguity was defined as the specification of the

i.
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referent to only one word of the sentence.

Complex lexical ambiguity

was defined as ambiguity involving a phrase or constituent of a
sentence whose resolution determines the meaning of the entire
sentence.

For example, the sentence:

a tarpaulin.

On top of everything there was

involves ambiguity in the sentence constituent, on top

of everything.

Only by specifying the complex relationship of this

phrase to the entire sentence can the ambiguity be resolved.

Due

to the difference in the underlying complexity of the semantic
ambiguity, differences in processing or recognition time would be
expected for each type of sentence.

MacKay and Bever (1967) have

viewed lexical ambiguity as a unitary phenomenon.

The question re-

mains whether processing time would vary if the distinction were made
between simple and complex lexical ambiguity.
Cue versus non-cue.

The issue of

~

cueing in the processing

of ambiguous sentences has been almost a non-issue up to the present
time.

No

~has

specifically tested the effect of cue versus non-cue

on ambiguous sentence processing.
The one-meaning interpretation hypothesis was clearly predicted
on the Ss' lack of awareness of the ambiguity in the experimental
sentences.

This hypothesis would not be applicable to those experi-

ments in which the Ss expected ambiguous test sentences.

The assign-

ment of one meaning to a sentence would be probable only if the S
were not actively searching for ambiguity.
Despite the apparent need for a separation of the cue versus
non-cue condition of experimental ambiguity, studies have failed to
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take into account
materials.

~s'

expectations of ambiguity in the experimental

It is important, then, to separate the findings of Cairns

(1971, 1973) and Mistler-Lachman (1972) who did not cue the Ss into
expecting ambiguous sentences and those studies which specifically
informed the Ss they were to be presented with ambiguous sentence
materials (Carey, Mehler, & Bever, 1970; MacKay & Bever, 1967).

In

the former instance the E presumably investigated ambiguous sentence
processing under the more natural conditions of non-cue or nonexpectation of finding sentence ambiguity.

The latter studies examined

ambiguous sentence processing under more artificial conditions in which
the

~s

were told that they would be presented with sentences which

could have more than one meaning.
Different latencies would be predicted because of the differences in the Ss' expectations.

Such latency variations were obtained

(cf. Mistler-Lachman, 1972) but were not related to the effect of
instructing~

prior to the experimental task.

The Ss' expectations

of ambiguity or non-ambiguity appears to be a pertinent variable if
a viable perception model of sentence processing is to be developed.
The purpose of the present study was then to:

1) clarify the

interrelationship or interaction between types of ambiguity and time
to process under cue and non-cue conditions; 2) verify the differences
in perceptual processing time between simple and complex lexical
ambiguity; and 3) analyze omission errors committed by the S when
he failed to resolve the ambiguity.
The following hypotheses were then offered:
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1.

For both the meaning judgment task and the picture

verification task, increased PT latencies will be a function of
increased complexity of ambiguity.
a)

Ambiguous sentences will require longer time to process than
non-ambiguous sentences.

b)

Underlying syntactic structure ambiguity will require longer
time to process than surface syntactic structure ambiguity.

c)

Sentences with complex lexical ambiguity will require longer
time to process than sentences with simple lexical ambiguity.
2.

~s

not cued to the presence of ambiguity in the sentences

prior to the picture verification task will commit more omission
errors.
3.

Ss in the cue condition will show significantly longer

process latencies in both tasks than those in the non-cue condition.
Two tasks were proposed to test these hypotheses:
judgment; and 2) a picture verification task.

1) a meaning

It was proposed that a

picture verification task would reveal resolution of either one or
both of the meanings of the sentence.
Five sentence types were tested:

unambiguous, syntactic

surface structure ambiguous sentences, underlying syntactic structure
ambiguous sentences, simple lexically ambiguous sentences, and complex
lexically ambiguous sentences.

Surface ambiguous sentences were

defined as sentences whose meaning is resolved by the rearrangement
of the surface structure components.

Deep structure, or underlying,

ambiguous sentences were defined as sentences whose meaning is resolved

28

by the different interpretation of linguistic strings hypothesized
to underlie the surface structure.

Simple lexical ambiguity was

defined as the specification of the referent to only one word of
the sentence.

Complex lexical ambiguity was defined as ambiguity

involving a phrase or constituent of more than one word, whose
resolution determines the meaning of the entire sentence.
Finally, the omission errors were recorded in order to reveal
whether there was a predominance of single meaning perception in a
non-cue condition, or a complete resolution of the sentence meanings.
The ineffectiveness of the meaningfulness task in the Mistler-Lachman
(1972) study might have been a function of the level of S awareness
of ambiguity and not the task as such.
from Mistler-Lachman (1972) in:

The present study differed

1) cueing half of the Ss to the

ambiguity; and 2) giving the Ss a task (meaning judgment) which would
induce full comprehension of the sentence meaning.

CHAPTER III
METHOD

subjects
A total of 60 Ss participated in the experiment, some in
partial fulfillment of a course requirement, and some as volunteers
from undergraduate classes at Loyola University of Chicago.

An

equal number of males and females were evenly divided into two
conditions of cue and non-cue.

The primary restrictions on the Ss

were that they be native speakers of English and at least second
generation Americans.
Materials
The 50 sentences used were taken from the Mistler-Lachman
(1972} dissertation.

Appendix B contains the experimental sentences.

The categories for the sources of ambiguity were taken from the same
source with the exception of the lexically ambiguous sentences.
Mistler-Lachman presented the lexically ambiguous sentences under one
category.

Simple lexical sentences were defined as those sentences

in which the referent of a single word was in question.

Complex

lexical ambiguity was defined as those sentences in which the referent
of a word determined whether the meaning of a whole phrase or the
meaning of a whole sentence was ambiguous.

Measurements of temporal

latency were taken to 1/lOOth of a second.

The sentences were counter-

balanced for length and embedding.

Percentage of bias was randomly
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distributed throughout all sentence categories.
Five types of sentences were presented:

non-ambiguous,

surface structure ambiguous, simple lexical ambiguous, complex
lexical ambiguous, and syntactically ambiguous.

Of the SO sentences

.presented, 10 sentences, or two from each category, were used for
practice sentences and were not included in the final statistical
analysis.

Following the presentation of the first 10 sentences, 40

sentences were presented, randomly arranged according to non-ambiguous,
ambiguous, and types of ambiguity.
Four pictures followed each sentence.

The pictures were cartoon

caricatures which depicted the single or double meaning of the test
sentences (correct) and two or three foils related to the theme of the
test sentence (incorrect).

The pictures were judged previous to the

actual experiment for quality and consistency by three Ss.

Appendix

C contains a sample of the pictures used in the experiment.

The Ss

were told the meaning(s) of the test sentences and asked to choose
the pictures which visually represented the meaning(s) of the
sentence.

No errors of mismatching for any type of sentence and

picture were found among the three Ss.
Apparatus
The apparatus for the study included a Kodak carousel projector, a BRS/LVE print-out counter and a BRS/LVE pulse generator
which measured the temporal latencies in 1/lOOth of a second.

A

hand-operated button changed the slides and also served as a mechanical
means for indicating meaning judgment and termination of the picture

31

judgment.

A small rear-projection screen was used which was divided

into four quadrants A, B, C, and D.

The target sentences were

presented in the center of the screen and the four pictures for the
picture verification tasks were presented simultaneously, one each in
each of the four quadrants.

The position of the correct pictures

was counterbalanced for each of the four areas of the screen.
Procedure
The Ss were taken individually to an experimental booth and
seated in front of a small projection screen.

Each was asked to read

along as tbe E read the following instruction:
Cue Condition
A series of sentences will be projected onto the screen in
front of you. You will be asked to look at each sentence
and to press the button in front of you when you have determined the meaning of the sentence. Now some of the sentences
you see can have more than one meaning. For example, the
sentence: The boy stood near the deck., can mean the boy
stood near the deck of a ship or near a deck of cards. Make
sure you see all the possible meanings of the sentence before
you press the button. Following the judgment of the sentence
meaning, a series of four pictures will be projected on the
screen in front of you. You are to look at the pictures and
choose those which visually show the meaning of the previously
presented sentence. You are to indicate your choice by calling
out the letter of the quadrant containing the picture or
pictures you have chosen. When you have made your final choice
press the button again and another sentence will appear. You
will then follow the same procedure. You will continue this
procedure for a total of 50 sentences. Are there any questions?
Non-cue Condition
The instructions were the same as those given in the cue
condition with the exception that no mention was made of sentence
ambiguity.

Instead, an example of a non-ambiguous sentence was used

when the S was instructed to determine the meaning of the sentence.
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The non-cue condition instructions were the following:
A series of sentences will be projected onto the screen in
front of you. You will be asked to look at each sentence
and to press the button in front of you when you have determined the meaning of the sentence. You might see a sentence
like the following: They are removing the boxes. This
sentence might mean that a group of people were removing
assorted boxes from a room for example. Make sure you see
all the possible meanings of the sentence before you press
the button. Following the judgment of the sentence meaning,
a series of four pictures will be projected on the screen
in front of you. You are to look at the pictures and choose
those which visually show the meaning of the previously
presented sentence. You are to indicate your choice by
calling out the letter of the quadrant containing the picture
or pictures you have chosen. When you have made your final
choice press the button again and another sentence will
appear. You will then follow the same procedure. You will
continue this procedure for a total of 50 sentences. Are
there any questions?
Following the instructions, the first sentence was projected
on the screen.

Coincidental with the projection, the timer was

automatically activated.

The timer gave a cumulative recording of

the latencies each time the S pressed the button indicating he had
determined the meaning of the sentence or had terminated the
picture search.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS
Three types of data analyses were carried out:

two three-way

analyses of variance on the meaning judgment and picture verification
latencies, and a two-way analysis of variance for omission errors.
The analysis of variance for the latencies was a one within subject
factor and a two between subject factor design for repeated measures.
The within subject factor was sentence type and the between factors
were gender and cue condition.

The analysis for the meaning judgment
1,

was computed on eight sentences within each type.
type was considered a fixed factor.

Sentences within

The analysis for the picture

verification condition was computed on the pictures for eight

I'

sentences within five types.

The mean perceptual latencies, in

seconds, were taken for all sentence types across all conditions, and
used as the input for the analyses.
The mean perceptual processing latencies for the two tasks
appear in Table 1.

The latencies for the meaning judgment revealed

longest PTs for surface and underlying syntactic ambiguous sentences,
and shortest PTs for the two lexically ambiguous sentences with the
unambiguous sentences showing shorter PTs than syntactic and longer
than lexical ambiguity.

The latencies for the picture verification

condition revealed longer PT for all types of ambiguous sentences
when compared with the unambiguous sentences.
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Table 1
Mean Latencies (in Seconds) for Perception Time to Process the
Sentence Types in the Sentence Meaning Judgment Task

Type

Unambiguous

5.61

Surface

5.92

Underlying
5.92

Simple
Lexical

Complex
Lexical

5.25

5.23

Mean Latencies (in Seconds) for Perception Time to Process the
Sentence Types in the Picture Verification Task

Type

Unambiguous

9.86

Surface

11.25

Underlying
12.00

Simple
Lexical

Complex
Lexical

10.52

11.19
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Meaning Judgment
Results of the meaning judgment appear in Table 2.
were significant:

Two effects

that for between sentence types, grouped ambiguous

and unambiguous, F (4, 224) = 9.97, £ < .001, and that for sentences
within type, F (35, 1960)

=

10.04, p < .001.

The latter effect in-

dicated an unequal degree of difficulty among the sentences within
type, probably due to different degrees of bias randomly distributed
among the sentences.
Neither cueing nor gender were significant effects.

Cueing

did not significantly increase perception time latencies for ambiguous
sentences.

The Cue x Type interaction was almost significant at the

.OS level.

The mean perceptual latencies of this interaction are

summarized in Table 3.
The cue condition resulted in longer, although nonsignificant
latencies for all sentence types when compared with the non-cue
condition.

In the cue condition, unambiguous, surface and underlying

syntax sentence types showed almost identical PTs.

The simple and

complex lexical sentences had shorter perceptual latencies than any
of the other three types.

The non-cue condition resulted in longer

latencies for the surface and underlying syntax sentences versus the
unambiguous sentences.

The unambiguous, simple lexical and complex

lexical latencies were almost identical.

The results of the Cue x

Type interaction are graphically summarized in Figure 1.
Two further analyses of the data were computed.

A series of

planned orthogonal comparisons were formulated for the significant
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Table 2
Three-Way Analysis of Variance for a One Within Factor, Two Between
Factor Repeated Measures Design.

Within Factor

= Sentence

Type, Between Factors = Cue and Gender

ss

Source

Error

Mean

P(CG}

74981.38

1

74981.38

906.96

C*

P(CG}

214.98

1

214.98

2.60

N.S.

G*

P(CG}

226.84

1

226.84

2.74

N.S.

T*

PT(CG}

221.49

4

55.37

9.97

< .001

S (T} *

PS(CGT}

1592.13

35

45.49

10.04

< .001

CG

(PCG}

60.77

1

60.77

0.74

N.S.

CT

PT(CG}

52.46

4

13.12

2.36

< .10

GT

PT(CG}

6.76

4

1.69

0.30

N.S.

4629.68

56

82.67

178.57

35

5.10

1.13

N.S.

P(CG}*
CS (T}

PS (CGT}

df

MS

F

p
I

,,I

·i

!;i

'i!
I~

GS(T}

PS(CGT}

147.55

35

4.22

0.93

N.S.

CGT

PT(CG}

18.02

4

4.50

0.81

N.S.

·.I'

II,,II~
' ;!'
jl;l
i

PT(CG}
CGS(T}
PS(CGT}

PS(CGT}

1244.00

224

5.55

152.34

35

4.35

1960

4.53

8878.94

0.96

N.S.

*C =cue and non-cue, G =gender (male and female}, T =sentence type,
S = sentence, P = people or subjects
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Table 3
Mean Latencies (in Seconds) for the Sentence Type X Cue
Interaction--Meaning Judgment

Type

•

Unambiguous

Surface

Underlying

Simple
Lexical

Complex
Lexical

Cue

6.18

6.14

6.21

5.37

5.54

Non-cue

5.06

5.70

5.63

5.14

4.93
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effect of sentence types.

These analyses were needed to measure the

locus of significant differences between the ambiguous and unambiguous
sentences.

A least significant difference comparison was also com-

puted for each ambiguous sentence type versus the unambiguous sentence
type.

Results of the orthogonal comparisons are summarized in

Table 4.-

Two comparisons were non-significant and three were

significant.

The PT for ambiguous sentences combined did not differ

significantly from the PT for the non-ambiguous category, as noted in
line

~of

Table 4.

And, a non-significant difference was also found

between the simple and complex lexically ambiguous sentences as in
line d of Table 4.
Three significant effects were found in the comparisons
summarized in Table 4.

The perceptual time latency for the surface

syntactic ambiguity differed significantly from the combined latencies
for the underlying syntactic and lexical ambiguity, as noted in line
b.

Additionally, line £of Table 4 reveals that the PT latency for

the underlying syntactic category was significantly longer than the
combined latencies for both lexically ambiguous sentence types.
most important finding is summarized in line e of Table 4.

The

The com-

- bined perceptual processing times for the surface and underlying
syntactically ambiguous sentences were significantly different from
the combined processing times of the simple and complex lexically
ambiguous sentences.

An examination of Table 1 reveals that the

syntactically-based sentences had longer latencies than the lexicallybased sentences.
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Table 4
Planned Orthogonal Comparisons for Effect of Sentence Type
in the Analysis of Variance for Sentence
Meaning Judgment Latency
Sentence
Type

Unambiguous
a.

+4

b.

Surface

Underlying

Simple

-1

-1

-1

-1

+3

-1

-1

-1

+2

-1

-1

+1

-1

-1

-1

c.
d.
e•

0

+1

a.

t =

b.

t = 3.63

~<

c.

t = 5.16

p < .01

d.

t =

e.

t = 6.31

• 28

.14

p = N.S.

~=

.01

N.S.

.e_< .01

+1

Complex
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As noted in Table 2 a significant effect was found for
sentence type.

The orthogonal comparison in line e of Table 4 also

revealed a significant difference between the surface and underlying
syntactic versus simple and complex lexical types.

A least

significant difference comparison was computed to determine a difference between each ambiguous type and the unambiguous sentence
category.

The results are summarized in Table 5.

The data revealed

that the ambiguous sentence perceptual processing latencies were
significantly different from the latencies for the non-ambiguous
sentences.

The mean latencies summarized in Table 2 combined with

the results in Table 5 revealed that the surface and underlying
syntactic sentences each took significantly longer to process than
the non-ambiguous sentences.

The lexically ambiguous sentences each

took significantly less time to process than the non-ambiguous
sentences.
In summary, for the meaning judgment task the following order

~~

:.li
,I

of increasing PT latency was found:

1) lexically ambiguous

sentences, with no difference between simple and complex; 2) nonambiguous sentences; and, 3) syntactically ambiguous sentences, with
no difference between surface and underlying complexity.

No

significant effects appeared for sex differences or cued and non-cued
condition.
Picture Verification
Two analyses were computed for the data in the picture

verification condition.

The data were the times to perceptually

'il
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Table S
Least Significant Difference Comparisons for Pairs of
Sentence Types--Sentence Meaning Judgment Latency

Types
Unambiguous vs. Surface

t

=

2.00

E_< .OS

Unambiguous vs. Syntactic

t

=

2.01

E_< .OS

Unambiguous vs. Simple Lexical

t

=

2.38

E_< .02

Unambiguous vs. Complex Lexical

t

=

2.S2

E_< .02
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process the pictures or sketches following each sentence.
data were measured in seconds.

The two analyses were:

These

1) an analysis

of variance for the perceptual processing latencies, and 2) a series
of planned orthogonal comparisons.
The results of the analysis of variance are summarized in
Table 6.

A comparison of the results between Table 2 and Table 6

revealed complete consistency between the analyses of variance for
the two experimental tasks.

In both analyses, that for the

m~aning

judgment condition (Table 2), and that for the picture verification
task (Table 6) the same effects were significant.

The first effect

was for sentence type, the second for within sentences of the same
type.

In the picture verification task for sentence type, F (4, 224)

= 8.2,

£ < .001.

For sketches within type, F (35, 1960) = 6.84,
,i

£ < .001.

Although the sentences and sketches were not identical

materials they were analogously related.

Both sentences and sketches

showed variability in level of difficulty within each type of sentence
category related to different bias percentages.

This confirmed a

similar finding in the meaning judgment condition.

No significant

effects were found for either cue, gender, or the Cue x Type interaction.
Given the significant effect of sentence type, a series of
planned orthogonal comparisons were computed for the ambiguous and
non-ambiguous sentences.

The data are summarized in Table 7.

Of

the five comparisons, three were significant and two were nonsignificant.

These results were not identical with the orthogonal

li
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Table 6
Three-Way Analysis of Variance for a One Within Factor, Two Between
Factor Repeated Measures Design.

Within Factor = Sentence

Type, Between Factors = Cue and Gender.

ss

Source

Error

Mean

P(CG)

288490.40

1

288490.40

565.00

C*

P(CG)

346.26

1

346.26

0.68

N.S.

G*

P(CG)

113.71

1

113.71

0.22

N.S.

T*

PT(CG)

1256.17

4

314.04

8.12

< .001

S(T)*

PS(CGT)

5333.42

35

152.38

6.84

< .001

CG

P(CG)

432.19

1

432.19

0.85

N.S.

CT

PT(CG)

152.44

4

38.11

0.98

N.S.

GT

PT(CG)

116.23

4

29.06

0.75

N.S.

28593.73

56

510.60

P (CG) *

df

MS

F

CS(T)

PS(CGT)

641.17

35

18.32

0.82

N.S.

GS(T)

PS(CGT)

920.40

35

26.30

1.18

N.S.

CGT

PT(CG)

299.85

4

74.96

1.94

N.S.

8665.23

224

38.68

841.29

35

24.04

1.08

N.S.

1960

22.28

PT(CG)
CGS(T)
PS(CGT)

PS(CGT)

43672.68

*C =cue and non-cue, G =gender (male and female), T =sentence type,
S = sentence, P = people or subjects
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Table 7
Planned Orthogonal Comparisons for Effect of Sentence Type
in the Analysis of Variance for Picture Verification Task

Sentence
Type

Unambiguous
a.

+4

b.

Surface

Underlying

Simple

-1

-1

-1

-1

+3

-1

-1

-1

+2

-1

-1

+1

-1

-1

-1

c.
d.

e.

0

a.

t = 4.35

E_< .01

b.

t =

E_= N.S.

c.

t = 3.28

E_< .01

d.

t = 1.19

E_= N.S.

e.

t = 2.70

E_< .01

.05

+1

+1

Complex
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comparisons for the meaning judgment.

This indicated that although

both analyses of variance showed the same variables to differ
significantly, the source of the significance was different for the
two tasks.
Consistent with Table 4 are the results summarized in lines

£t

~,

and e of Table 7.

The latency for the underlying sentences

versus the combined latencies of the lexically ambiguous sentences
were significant.
An

These data are analyzed in line c of Table 7.

examination of the means in Table 1 for the picture verification

task revealed a longer latency for the underlying syntactic ambiguity
than either of the latencies for the lexically ambiguous sentences.
The second consistent result is summarized in lined of Table 7.

The

latencies between simple and complex lexically ambiguous sentences
were not significantly different.
summarized in line e of Table 7.

The third consistent result is
A significant difference was found

between the syntactically-based sentences and the lexically-based
sentences.
line~,

Combining the information in Table 1 with the result in

Table 7, the syntactically-based sentences had longer per-

ceptual processing latencies than the lexical-type of ambiguity.
Inconsistent with the results in Table 4 are the data in lines
a and b of Table 7.

In line a, the combined latencies for the

ambiguous sentences were significantly different from the unambiguous
sentences.

The results from the verification task as well as the

meaning judgment task, summarized in Table 1, showed that the mean
latencies for the ambiguous sentences in the verification task were
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longer than the mean latency for the unambiguous sentences.

The

longer latencies for the ambiguous sentences than for the unambiguous
sentences in the picture verification task were partially due to the
demands of the task.

The ambiguous sentences required the S to

choose two pictures and the unambiguous sentences only one picture.
Logically, more time is required to choose two pictures than one.
The second inconsistent result is summarized in line b,
Table 7.

The surface syntactic latencies did not differ significantly

from the combined latencies of the other unambiguous types.

The in-

consistent result was due to the relative increase in the mean
latencies for lexically ambiguous sentences in the picture
verification task.
Omission Errors
In the picture verification condition, it had been hypothesized
that the non-cue condition would produce more omission errors than the
cue condition.

This hypothesis was based on the assumption that prior

awareness of ambiguity was necessary for complete resolution of an
ambiguous sentence.

Without this awareness, a failure to choose or

"find" the second picture was expected.

The analysis of omission

errors was necessary, then, as a measure of the prevalence of single
meaning perception, especially in the non-cue condition.
A specific type of omission was chosen to analyze response
characteristics in the cue versus non-cue condition.

Omission errors

were defined as the failure to select one appropriate picture in
conjunction with a single correct choice.

An

example is the
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following:

The crowd gathered to see the star.

ambiguous on the simple lexical level.

This sentence is

An omission error was com-

mitted when one correct picture was chosen, e.g., a picture of a
crowd viewing a celestial body, but the second correct picture was
not chosen, e.g., a picture of a crowd gathering to see a movie
star.

This type of error represented the instance where the S

perceived a single meaning of the sentence and failed to resolve
the ambiguity.
The results of the analysis of variance on errors are
summarized in Table 8.
male versus female.

The main effects were cue versus non-cue and

Gender was studied to determine if the non-

difference between male and female in process times for meaning
judgment and picture verification tasks also held for omission errors.
For cue,

£

= NS.

= .11,

~

{1, 56)

= 8.90,

£ < .005, and for gender,

~

{1, 56)

The Cue x Gender interaction was non-significant,

£

= NS.

=

.59,

! {1, 56)

The mean number of omission errors for the cue

condition was 10.10 and 16.03 for the non-cue condition.

This finding

in conjunction with the analysis of variance for omission errors
showed significantly more errors in the non-cue condition than in the
cue condition.
In order to eliminate the possibility that the Ss in the noncue condition were unaware of the necessity of choosing two pictures
if two correct pictures were present, all Ss were questioned following
the final sentence presentation.

All of the

~s

reported that they

had understood the instructions to choose two pictures if two
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Table 8
Two-Way Analysis of Variance for Omission Errors.

Omission

Errors for Analysis were Defined as a Single Omission
Error in Conjunction With One Correct Response

Source

ss

df

MS

F

Total

3891.73

59

Cue

528.06

1

528.06

8.90

35.26

1

35.26

.59

N.S.

6.68

1

6.68

.11

N.S.

3321.73

56

59.32

Gender
Cue X Gender
Error

< .005

so
meanings were present.
Random samplings of approximately 15 Ss in the non-cue
condition gave some clue as to the comprehension process following
the picture verification stage.
into two distinct categories.

The Ss in the non-cue condition fell
Approximately 8

~s

reported actively

failing to choose the second meaning of some sentences explaining
that the second "less-biased" meaning was rejected as being improbable.
This response pattern prevailed despite an understanding by the ss
of the necessity of choosing two pictures if they recognized two
meanings.

A second category of

~s

reported a failure to recognize

the second meaning in most of the experimental sentences despite the
fact that 80% of the sentences were ambiguous.

These Ss lent tentative

support to the one-meaning hypothesis (cf. Foss, Bever, & Silver, 1968;
Carey, Mehler, & Bever, 1970) discussed above, which contended that
one meaning of an ambiguous sentence is immediately perceived without
interference from the other meaning.
:I

:'1',

Summary

Ill

In summary, the following hypotheses were offered with the
corresponding results:
1)

For both the meaning judgment task and the picture

verification task, increased latencies of recognition were hypothesized
to be a function of increased complexity of ambiguity.
was partially confirmed.

This hypothesis

Longest latencies occurred in the processing

of underlying syntactic ambiguity in both tasks.

However, in the

meaning judgment task the shorter latencies in both lexical categories
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were not predicted.
la)

Ambiguous sentences will require longer time to process
than non-ambiguous sentences.

This hypothesis was partially

confirmed in the meaning judgment task and completely conformed in the picture verification task.

In the meaning

judgment task only the syntactically-based ambiguous
sentences showed longer latencies than the unambiguous
sentences.

The lexically based sentences showed significantly

shorter latencies than the unambiguous sentence types.
lb)

Underlying syntactic structure ambiguity will require longer
time to process than surface syntactic ambiguity.

Although

the picture verification task showed latencies in the
hypothesized direction, neither task showed a significant
difference between the underlying and surface syntactic
ambiguity in time to process.
lc)

Sentences with complex lexical ambiguity will require longer
time to process than sentences with simple lexical ambiguity.
This hypothesis was not confirmed in either of the
experimental tasks although the picture verification task
showed latencies in the hypothesized direction.
2)

The Ss not-cued to the presence of ambiguity in the

sentences prior to the experimental task will commit more omission
errors.

Statistical confirmation was found for this hypothesis.

More errors were found in the non-cue than cue condition.
3)

The Ss in the cue condition will show significantly longer
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processing latencies in both tasks than those in the non-cue
condition.

No significant differences were found in the latencies

for the cue and non-cue conditions, although the latencies were in
the direction hypothesized.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION
The discussion of the data is divided into three general
considerations:

1)

a comparison of the present results with the

results of prior studies; 2)
and, 3)

an explanation of the present results;

an interpretation of these results.

The first two con-

siderations are discussed in terms of the meaning judgment task,
the picture verification task, cue condition latencies, omission
errors, meaning versus meaningfulness, and linguistic processing
models.

An interpretation of the data is discussed in terms of a

compromise model.
A brief review of the types of ambiguity and experimental
tasks precedes the discussion.
five types:

The sentence materials were of

unambiguous, surface structure syntactic ambiguous,

deep structure syntactic ambiguous, simple and complex lexical
ambiguous sentences.

Surface ambiguous sentences were defined as

sentences whose meaning is resolved by the rearrangement of the
surface structure components or by a second constituent analysis of
the surface structure of the sentence.

Deep structure ambiguous

sentences were defined as sentences whose meaning is resolved by an
understanding of possible strings which are hypothesized to underlie
the surface structure.

Simple lexical ambiguity was defined as the

specification of the referent to only one word of the sentence.
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complex lexical ambiguity was defined as ambiguity involving a phrase
or constituent of a sentence whose resolution determines the meaning
of the entire sentence.
The Ss in this experiment read the sentences and performed
the following tasks:

1}

in a meaning judgment the Ss pressed a

button when they understood the meaning of the sentence; 2}

in a

picture verification task the Ss chose the picture or pictures which
gave a visual explanation of the previously shown sentence.

The

~s,

one-half of whom were male and one-half of whom were female, performed
these tasks under two conditions:

1}

half were alerted to possible

ambiguity in the task (cue condition}; and 2}
not (non-cue condition}.

the other half were

The major variables of the study, then,

were types of ambiguity, cueing, and gender.
Types of Ambiguity:

Meaning Judgment

In the meaning judgment task the unambiguous sentence latencies
were significantly different from the latencies for the ambiguous
sentences.

Both the surface syntactic and underlying syntactic

sentences required significantly longer processing times than the
unambiguous types, but underlying syntactic ambiguity demanded no
longer time to process than that for surface structure.

Both lexically

ambiguous categories showed shorter latencies than the unambiguous
sentences, but again showed no latency difference between lexical
types.
The above results were derived from the combined latencies of
the cue and non-cue conditions.

As previously noted, in the Cue x
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Type interaction, the syntactically-based ambiguous sentences had
longer latencies than the unambiguous sentences only in the non-cue
condition.

The simple lexical and complex lexical latencies were

shorter than the unambiguous sentence latencies only in the cue
condition.

In both instruction conditions, however, the syntactically-

based ambiguous sentences showed longer times to process than the
lexically-based ambigious sentences.
Figure 2 represents the effect of type of ambiguity on
processing time.

Contrary to MacKay (1966) not all of the ambiguous

sentences resulted in longer latencies as a function of level of
complexity.

The lexically ambiguous sentences not only did not yield

longer latencies when compared with the unambiguous category, but
rather showed significantly shorter perception times than the
unambiguous sentences.
Mistler-Lachman (1972) found that a meaningfulness judgment
without context produced no significant differences in perceptual
latencies between unambiguous and ambiguous sentences.

When context

was provided for the meaningfulness judgment, surface syntactic
ambiguity required a significantly longer time than the unambiguous,
syntactic underlying, or lexical types.

No significant differences

were found in the latencies between the latter three categories.
Mistler-Lachman's results, however, did not reflect the full comprehension of the sentence meaning.

The failure to comprehend the

sentence could have resulted in a failure to resolve the ambiguity.
Using a different task these results were not confirmed in the present

I'

I
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study.

In a meaning judgment, without context, the present study

showed a significant difference between the ambiguous and unambiguous
sentences.

As noted above, the surface structure did require longer

processing time in relation to the single-meaning sentences, but
underlying syntactic sentences also required longer latencies than
lexical or unambiguous sentences.

Therefore, in using a meaningful-

ness judgment Mistler-Lachman was not testing the effect of ambiguity
on sentence processing.

Her task allowed the S to make a judgment

without completely processing the sentence.
Foss (1971), using a phoneme-monitoring task, also found no
differences between lexical and deep syntactic ambiguity.

The longer

latencies for surface syntactic and deep structure ambiguity versus
simple and complex lexical ambiguity in the present study were
contrary to Foss' results.
The present study confirmed in part the results of MacKay and
Bever (1967).

They found that perception time for lexical ambiguity

was shorter than that for surface structure ambiguity, but their
longest latencies were obtained for the underlying syntactic ambiguity.
Although, in the present study, deep structure syntactic ambiguity
required the longest time to process of all the sentence types no
significant differences were found between this type and the surface
syntactic structure ambiguity.

Lexical ambiguity showed the shortest

latencies among ambiguous sentences in the MacKay and Bever (1967)
study.

These latencies, however, were not significantly shorter than

those for unambiguous sentences as found in the present study.
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The following results need to be explained:

1) the shorter

perception time in the lexically ambiguous categories than in the
unambiguous sentences.

No previous studies reported this finding.

2) The identical latencies for the underlying and surface ambiguity.
In previous studies the relative perception time for surface structure
has fluctuated depending on the task.

3) The identical latencies for

the simple and complex lexical categories.

No previous studies

have made this distinction.
!ypes of Ambiguity:

Picture Verification

The picture verification task revealed data similar in some
respects to the meaning judgment task but with specific differences
requiring a more comprehensive explanation.

Figure 3 shows the

effect of ambiguity on picture verification times.

The present data

argued against Mistler-Lachman's (1972) criticisms of MacKay's (1966)
data.

MacKay found the following order of processing times:

unambiguous, lexical, syntactic surface, and underlying syntactic.
The present study provided tentative support for MacKay's data as
presented in Figure 4.

Discounting the complex lexical category

which was not used in MacKay's study, the curve for the present study
was similar in configuration to the MacKay (1966) study.

In the

present study, significant differences were not found between all
ambiguity categories.
Mistler-Lachman (1972) questioned MacKay's results primarily
on the basis of methodology.

She criticized the imprecision of

stop-watches to measure latency.

L

The completion times in the MacKay
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study included the reaction time of the E in starting and stopping
the watch, the time to flip over an index card, the time to read
the fragment silently, the time to think of a completion, the time
to read the fragment aloud, and the time to speak the completion
aloud.
Although possibly valid for MacKay's methodology, MistlerLachman's criticisms of the MacKay study do not apply to the methodology of the present study.

The present study used a picture

verification task in place of the production without context of
MacKay (1966} and Mistler-Lachman (1972}.

The picture verification

task was under the complete control of the

~

when he made his final choice.

who pressed a button

The task then measured time to recall

the sentence, time to scan the pictures, time to verbalize the
picture choices, and time to press the button.

The reaction time

measurement was entirely automatic thus eliminating a major portion
of the Mistler-Lachman criticism.

Given the precision of the present

methodology, MacKay's findings of differential processing times
relative to levels of ambiguity seem more valid than MistlerLachman's findings of no difference.
Cue Conditions:

Omission Errors

A discussion of the data from the omission errors must
necessarily consider the non-significant difference found between
latencies in the cue and non-cue conditions.

Contrary to the

hypothesis, the cue condition did not reveal longer latencies than
the non-cue condition.

The longer latencies were hypothesized as
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a result of an active search process for ambiguity.
Of interest to the present study was the effect of prior
cueing on the response patterning during the picture verification
task.

It was specifically hypothesized that Ss in the non-cue
, I

condition would have a tendency to produce single responses on the
picture verification task.
sumption that

~s

This hypothesis was based on the pre-

in the non-cue condition would fail to resolve the

ambiguity more often than Ss who had been cued to the presence of
ambiguity.
The present study found no significant differences in overall
processing times between cue and non-cue conditions but, a significant
difference was found between the two cue conditions in number of
omission errors and a nearly significant Cue x Type interaction.

As

previously stated, omission errors were defined as the failure of a
~

to resolve one meaning of the ambiguous sentences although the

alternate meaning was correctly verified.

The non-cue condition had

more single omission errors than the cue condition.

The greater

number of omission errors indicated either a lack of comprehension of
the alternate sentence meaning or, though the alternate meaning was
perceived, the corresponding picture was not indicated in the
response.
Previous studies have given only partial explanations for a
small portion of the reported experimental results.

An

adequate

model of linguistic processing must explain the differential
perceptual processing time for different ambiguity types in the

I!
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meaning judgment condition, the different PTs in the picture
verification task, and the difference in omission errors in the cued
and non-cued conditions.

The first stage in the development of such

a model is the specification of the difference between the present
meaning judgment task and the meaningfulness task of MistlerLachman (1972).
Meaning Versus Meaningfulness
Given the present findings of some differences in the latencies
for the experimental sentences, a comparison must be made between the
meaningfulness task of Mistler-Lachman (1972) and the meaning judgment
task in the present study.

As previously mentioned, the meaningfulness

judgment, especially without any context for the sentences, yielded no
difference in the perceptual latencies.

The lack of any difference

between the processing times for ambiguous and non-ambiguous
sentences was attributed to the lack of comprehension when judging
whether a sentence was meaningful or not.

Mistler-Lachman reported

that some Ss did not even finish reading the sentence before making
the judgment.

Evidently, the Ss were tapping their knowledge of

sentence structure and semantics (Katz & Fodor, 1963).

Mistler-

Lachman (1972) stated that the Ss were not looking for sentence
meanings as much as searching for semantic anomalies or selectional
constraints as a basis for a meaningful or non-meaningful response.
These semantic anomalies usually involved violations of subcategorization rules which according to Chomsky (1965) and Katz and Fodor
(1963) are essentially syntactic violations.
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The present data did not agree with the findings of MistlerLachman's meaningfulness judgment task.

From the present results,

it was clear that ambiguity affected processing time.
The present experiment, then, attempted to test the adequacy
of the Mistler-Lachman explanation of the data by using a meaning
judgment task which differed from the meaningfulness judgment in
one respect.

Instead of the

~

simply judging whether a sentence was

meaningful or not, it was hypothesized that the

~

must comprehend

the sentence in actively searching for its meaning.
have required the

~

This task should

to finish reading the entire sentence before

making any judgment about the meaning of the sentence.

Given this

task the S would search the entire syntactic structure, both surface
and underlying, as well as the meaning for lexical items, for clues
to the meaning of the sentence.
The present data supported an hypothesized difference between
a meaningfulness and meaning judgment.

If "levels" of comprehension

is a valid way to explain linguistic processing (cf. Mistler-Lachman,
1974), the meaning judgment required a "deeper" comprehension of the
linguistic strings.
In the meaning judgment, two fundamental distinctions were
made between the ambiguous sentences:

those with ambiguity on a

syntactic level and those with ambiguity on a semantic level.

A

significant finding was that lexical ambiguity required a shorter
time to process than non-ambiguity.
Lexically, or semantically, based ambiguity was recognized
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rapidly (5.25 sec. for simple and 5.23 for complex).

This search

may be analogous to the primitive or immediate comprehension which
includes the invoking of the semantic memory system (Mistler-

I

Lachman, 1972).

'
I
I
I

I

I

t

This primitive comprehension includes initial word

decoding, parsing, and the invoking of semantic memory.

An hypothesized reason for the short latencies was that the
Ss were not parsing the entire sentence but simply cueing in on the
single ambiguous word or the ambiguous constituent of the sentence.
This cueing would not necessarily require the S to resolve the
ambiguity but simply to find a single meaning of the word or
constituent.
A more complex effect was noted in the meaning judgment task
when both surface structure and deep structure ambiguity showed
significantly longer latencies than the unambiguous sentences, though,
no significant differences were noted between the two types of

'

I

syntactic ambiguity.

The longer latencies indicated that these two

ambiguous categories demanded some extra processing time in the
linguistic decoding.
If the meaning judgment were shallow as in the levels of
"meaningfulness" then no differences in processing times for the
syntactic ambiguous categories would be expected.

I

The Effect of Instruction
Prior to a discussion of linguistic processing models,
consideration must be given to the Cue x Type interaction in the
meaning judgment task.

Although no significant effect was found
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for cue in the above task, a nearly significant effect was found for
cue x type.
following:

The data in the Cue x Type interaction might explain the
1) the shorter latencies for the lexically ambiguous

versus unambiguous sentences, and 2) longer latencies for the syntactic
ambiguous sentences.
When compared to the unambiguous sentences, shorter latencies
for the lexically-based sentences were found only in the cue condition.
In the non-cue condition nearly equal latencies were obtained for
unambiguous, simple lexical and complex lexically ambiguous sentences.

An examination of the instructions for the cue and non-cue condition
showed that for the cue condition an example of a lexically ambiguous
sentence was given to the subject.
given to the subject.

No other type of sentence was

The lexically ambiguous example might have

"pre-set" the subject to look for this particular type of ambiguity,
and to "cue-in" on the locus of ambiguity.

A similar effect of

shorter latencies for the lexically ambiguous sentences was not found
in the non-cue condition.

Once pre-set for the lexically ambiguous

sentences, the subject may have found the presence of syntactic
ambiguity and non-ambiguous sentences confusing resulting in longer
processing times for these latter types of sentences.
The non-cue condition showed almost identical latencies for
non-ambiguous, simple, and complex lexically ambiguous sentences.
The subjects in this condition were given an example of a nonambiguous sentence in the instructions.

Without a pre-set for lexical

ambiguity as in the cue condition, the subject could not as easily

L
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cue-in on the locus of ambiguity.

Instructional bias seems to account

for the shorter latencies in the cue condition for lexical versus
unambiguous sentences, and bias may represent the best explanation
for the lexical latency data.

The subjects in the non-cue condition

did not have the advantage of cueing and their'data is consistent
with other researchers who have found no effect due to lexical
ambiguity (e.g., Mistler-Lachman, 1972).

The longer latencies in the

syntactically-based ambiguous sentences, however, cannot be explained
solely on the basis of the instructional set.
Although the above explanation of the lexical data pertains
to a portion of the data, it cannot explain the longer latencies
in the syntactically-based ambiguous sentences versus the unarnbiguous sentences.

An

examination of present linguistic processing

models might yield an appropriate model for the present data.
Linguistic Processing:

Present Models

Three general models of ambiguous sentence processing have
been proposed from past research.

A brief review of these models

may be helpful in understanding that model to be proposed based on
task demands.
Carey, Mehler, and Bever (1970) discussed an exhaustive
computation hypothesis.

According to this model all of the possible

meanings of an ambiguous sentence are encoded and processed and
finally a choice is made between the meanings.

It was hypothesized

that the differences in ambiguous sentence processing latencies
reflected the extra time to process two meanings and to choose the
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appropriate meaning.
A second model was also proposed (Foss, Bever, & Silver, 1968}
which has been called the unitary perception model.

This model stated

that a single meaning of an ambiguous sentence is computed with no
interference from the other possible meanings.

The second meaning is

only computed when contextual information disconfirms the increased
latencies present.
A third model, an oblivion hypothesis, was hypothesized by
MacKay (1966} in which no meaning is assigned to ambiguous sentences
until there is enough information from context or other sources to
choose among the possible meanings.
A fourth model was suggested by Olson and MacKay (1974) which
was appropriately labeled an interaction model.

This model emphasized

the role of perceptual suppression in the processing of ambiguous
sentences; especially the lexically ambiguous ones.

It was hypoth-

esized that "the ambiguous lexical input simultaneously activates two
conflicting sets of semantic features which correspond to the two
meanings of the ambiguity" (Olson & MacKay, 1974, p. 468}.

These two

meanings were said to interact with mutual inhibition at a subthreshold
level.

The perception of the one meaning necessarily required the

suppression of the other meaning.

This model was said to account for

the usual non-perception of ambiguity in everyday speech.
Linguistic Processing:

A Proposed Model

The above-presented models of comprehension have given
explanations of linguistic processing which could apply to the present

69

data.

Clearly, process times for the surface syntactic and underlying

syntactic ambiguity were significantly different from the simple and
complex lexical ambiguity.

I

'
I

I

I

Given the data, the

~appeared

to be

making a syntactic versus semantic judgment of ambiguity.
The finding of no difference in processing time between
lexically ambiguous and non-ambiguous sentences in the non-cue
condition suggested two possible explanations.

The S could have

perceived both meanings of the lexically ambiguous sentence but, since
lexical ambiguity usually involves only one word or phrase, the S
may have been able to "cue-in" on that one word, and not be forced to
process the entire sentence.

~

This "cueing-in" could have substantially

reduced the perceptual latency.
"Cueing-in" on the locus of ambiguity represents the best model

I

of linguistic processing of lexical ambiguity in the non-cue and
possibly cue conditions.

It was hypothesized, however, that complex

lexical ambiguity would yield longer latencies than simple lexical
ambiguity.

The simple and complex lexical categories showed no

difference in perceptual times to process.
for the failure to find a difference.

Two reasons are suggested

The first explanation states

that the distinction between simple and complex lexical ambiguity was
artificial. No other researcher had made this distinction preferring
to view lexical ambiguity as a unitary phenomenon.

This explanation

is illogical in that the complex lexical ambiguity required the S
to process a structurally more complex sentence.

By definition complex

lexical ambiguity involved a phrase or constituent of a sentence whose
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resolution determines the meaning of the entire sentence.

This type

of sentence requires the S to do more than simply "cue-in" on a single
referent in the sentence.

The distinction between simple and complex

lexical ambiguity does not seem to be an artificial distinction.
Fodor, Bever, and Garrett (1974) suggested a second explanation, a sequential processing model of ambiguity.
that if a portion of a sentence has
the

~possible

~possible

meanings will be processed.

This model states

meanings, only one of

This one interpretation

will be accepted by the S until other disambiguating material is
encountered which contradicts the interpretation.

Support for this

model has been given by Carey, Mehler, and Bever (1970) and Foss,
Bever, and Silver (1968).

If only one meaning of the simple and

complex lexically ambiguous sentences are computed, no difference
would be found in the relative latencies of the lexical categories.
This model predicts the lack of difference found in the present
study.
A combination of subject cueing-in on the locus of lexical
ambiguity, and the sequential processing model, best describes the
comprehension strategy.

This strategy allows the

~

to process the

locus of ambiguity without fully comprehending the other components
of the sentence or the other meanings of the sentence.

Mistler-

Lachman (1972) adopted this explanation of processing.

She stated

that immediate comprehension of a sentence might include initial
word decoding, parsing, and invoking of the semantic memory system.
Given the nature of lexical ambiguity and the demands of the task,
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an appeal to the semantic memory might explain the relatively short

latencies in the lexically ambiguous sentences.

t

t

Additionally, no

conclusive evidence exists which would substantiate the hypothesis
that the lexically ambiguous sentences were disambiguated during
the meaning judgment.
The longer latencies for syntactic surface and underlying
structure processing are more difficult to explain.
it is clear that the

~

From the data

was not processing the syntactically-based

sentences in the same way as the lexically-based sentences.

As will

be recalled, in the meaning judgment the surface and underlying
sentences required significantly longer time to process than the
unambiguous sentences.

I

In addition, the surface and underlying

syntactic sentences were not significantly different from each other
in processing latencies.

A sequential model does not predict the

long latencies although it would predict the finding of no difference
between the syntactic surface and underlying sentences.

The "cueing-

in on the locus of ambiguity" explanation may not apply because of
the complex nature of the syntactic relationships in the sentences.
Fodor, Bever, and Garrett (1974) proposed a second
simultaneous processing model of ambiguity.

According to this model,

if a portion of a sentence has n possible meanings each of the n
structures is computed and carried in short-term memory.
ambiguating material is encountered by the S all
retained.

The sentence is comprehended in

~ways

~

If no dis-

analyses are

as ambiguous.

particular model predicts that ambiguity will increase time to

This
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process because of the
be held in memory.

~paths

of analysis and computation that must

Of the various models discussed, the simultaneous

model may provide the best explanation for the syntactic data.

The

ambiguity in the syntactically-based sentences did contribute to the
memory load.
A question remains about the finding of no difference in the
latencies between the surface and underlying syntactic ambiguities.
Contrary to the hypothesis, underlying syntactic ambiguous sentences
did not yield longer latencies than the surface syntactic ambiguous
sentences.

In the non-cue condition the underlying ambiguity even

showed a non-significantly shorter latency than the surface type.
According to the data, the resegrnenting of the surface structure
took as much time as the specification of the complex underlying
relations in the underlying type.

This finding is not entirely

unexpected if the linguistic processing of syntactic structure is
examined.

According to the Standard Theory the underlying relations

of an ambiguous surface string must be disambiguated before the
surface structure can be resegrnented.

The syntactic analysis in both

the surface and underlying ambiguous sentences is in the underlying
structure.

Thus, the primary processes of disambiguation are nearly

identical for both types of syntactic ambiguity.

Once the underlying

structure has been disambiguated, the resegrnentation of the surface
structure is accomplished in a relatively short time.
The data indicated that the

~

was capable of comprehending

the sentences semantically or syntactically depending on the demands
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of the experimental materials.

The

~was

capable of recognizing the

type of ambiguity involved and cueing-in on the locus of ambiguity
if lexical or using a simultaneous processing method of analysis if
syntactic.

The strongest argument for this explanation is that the

unambiguous sentences fell between the syntactic and lexical
categories.

Sachs (1967) alluded to this dual comprehension under-

lying normal linguistic processing.

The Ss were able to shift

"cognitive gears" depending on the ambiguity involved.

The results

of the present study indicated that the Ss were able rapidly to
determine whether a sentence was ambiguous or not, determine whether
the ambiguity was syntactically-based or lexically-based, and then
use the cognitive process which best fit the demands of the
experiment.

The complexity of the ambiguity was less important than

whether it was syntactic or lexical in nature.
of the

~

This apparent ability

rapidly to shift processing strategies had not been noted

in previous literature.
The picture verification condition showed somewhat more
complicated effects than the meaning judgment.

All types of ambiguity

showed longer latencies than the unambiguous types.
due.to the demands of the experiment.

This effect was

The ambiguous sentences

required the S to choose two pictures and the unambiguous sentences
required the S to choose only one of the four pictures presented.
In the picture verification task for the lexical ambiguity, the

~

was not as easily able simply to cue-in on the locus of ambiguity as
in the meaning judgment.

This may have resulted in significantly
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longer latencies for the simple and complex lexical ambiguity versus
the unambiguous sentences.
Between ambiguity types, the picture verification task showed

t

'

results similar to the meaning judgment.

The lexically-based

sentences combined had significantly shorter latencies than the
surface and underlying syntactic latencies.

The S was again making

an explicit distinction between syntactic and lexical ambiguity.

The

syntactic ambiguity involved either a rearrangement of the surface
structure components or a specification of deep structure relationships.

The pictures reflected the inherent complexity of the

ambiguous syntactic relationships.

The lexical ambiguity, however,

involved a quicker decision process.

This ambiguity usually involved

either a single component of the sentence or a single constituent of

'

the sentence.

The

~could

rapidly scan the pictures which resolved

this "simpler" type of ambiguity.

The picture verification task

also indicated that the latency for underlying ambiguity was not
significantly different from the latency for surface ambiguity.

The

data also indicated that simple lexical ambiguity did not differ
significantly from complex lexical ambiguity.

The latencies, how-

ever, were in the hypothesized direction of longer latencies for the
complex lexical ambiguity versus the simple type.
The simultaneous model of ambiguous sentence processing seems
best to fit the data for the picture verification condition.

As

previously noted, this model predicts an increase in memory load with
ambiguous sentences.

Both meanings of the sentence must be available
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to the S if he is to perform the verification task.

The

~may

still

make the basic distinction between the syntactic and lexical type of
ambiguity yielding longer latencies in the surface and underlying
syntactic ambiguity and shorter latencies in the simple and complex
lexical ambiguity.
Cue Versus Non-cue
The hypothesized longer latencies in the cue condition were
not confirmed by the present data.
immediately suggests itself.

No model of linguistic processing

Logically, longer latencies should be

obtained in the cue condition as the

~

actively searches for the

ambiguity in the experimental sentences.

The non-cue condition

should have shown shorter latencies than the cue condition because
the S would not be immediately aware of the ambiguity.
Two

hypotheses are offered as possible explanations of the

cue versus non-cue data.

Although the

~might

not have been

immediately aware of the ambiguity in the non-cue condition, over a
number of trials the

~

could eventually have recognized the presence

of ambiguity in the sentences.

No data confirms this explanation

because the first ten "practice" trials were not used in the data
analysis.

During the first ten trials the S may have recognized

the ambiguity; therefore, by sentence 11 the non-cue condition would
be the same as the cue condition.

The second explanation might be

that since the example of ambiguity given the subject was that of
lexical ambiguity, the subject was "pre-set" for lexical ambiguity.
The possibly rapid processing of such anticipated ambiguity as
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structure resegmented can the ambiguity be resolved.

It was this

ambiguity resolution which contributed to the latencies in the surface
syntactically ambiguous sentences.

Again, similar findings were noted

in the picture verification condition.
Finally, the present study emphasized the importance of an
adequate production model for linguistic processing.

The abstract

competence model of grammar as developed by Chomsky (1965) provided
new insights into the understanding of the structure of natural
grammars.

By definition, however, the competence model does not

specify the processes underlying grammar use.
must account for such processes as:

The production model

sentence recognition, perception

strategies, sentence storage, linguistic disambiguation, and sentence
retrieval from long-term memory.

'

I

L

SU~Y

·,

The present study examined the effect of various types of
ambiguity on linguistic processing.

Basic to the study were the

concepts of deep and surface structure as originally hypothesized
by Noam Chomsky.
Five types of sentences were used:

unambiguous, syntactic

surface ambiguous, syntactic underlying ambiguous, simple lexical
ambiguous, and complex lexical ambiguous sentences.

A total of 50

sentences, 10 of each type, were presented in a random order on a
rear-projection screen.

Four pictures were drawn for each of the

sentences which either depicted the meaning or meanings of the
sentence or were related in a general way to the theme of the
sentence.
A total of 60 Ss were used in the study:
females.

30 males and 30

Each S was tested individually on two different tasks:

a

meaning judgment and a picture verification task in one of two
different instruction conditions.
condition, told the

~

One instruction condition, the cue

about the presence of ambiguity in the experi-

mental materials and then gave an example of an ambiguous sentence.
The instructions for the non-cue condition did not mention linguistic

1

ambiguity and no example of ambiguity was given to the S.
being given the cue or non-cue instructions, the

~was

After

asked to press

the button which he was holding in order to engage the first slide.
After the sentence appeared, the

~was
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asked to press the button again

r
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when he understood the meaning of the sentence.
single slide appeared and the

~

Four pictures on a

was asked to choose the picture or

pictures which gave a visual explanation of the sentence.
The latencies for both the meaning judgment and picture
verification tasks were automatically recorded each time the
pressed the button.

~

The latencies were defined as perception time

(PT).

In addition to the perception times, omission errors in the
picture verification task were recorded.

Omission errors were defined

as a single error in conjunction with a single correct response.
This data reflected the S's failure to resolve both meanings of the
ambiguous sentences.
The results were as follows:

In the meaning judgment task

the longest latencies occurred for the underlying and surface
syntactic ambiguous sentences and the shortest latencies occurred for
the lexically ambiguous sentences.

The latencies for the unambiguous

sentences were shorter than the latencies for the syntactic types

I

I
II

and longer than the latencies for the lexical types.
verification task, the latencies were as follows:

In the picture

syntactic ambiguous

types, lexically ambiguous types, and unambiguous sentences.

Finally,

the non-cue condition showed more omission errors than the cue
condition.
The results were discussed in terms of a proposed model of
linguistic processing.

This model combined a parallel processing

model with a "cueing-in on the locus of ambiguity" model.

The data
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showed that an individual is able to distinguish between non-ambiguous,
syntactically-based ambiguous, and lexically-based ambiguous sentences.
This data also showed that an individual is able to use different
perception strategies depending on the type of linguistic material
encountered and the type of task demanded of the individual.

j
I

I
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Tree diagram of an underlying syntactic ambiguous sentence.
The shooting of the hunters was terrible.
Meaning 1:

St. 1
St. 2

(Someone) shoot hunters.
is terrible.

Meaning 2:

St. 1
St. 2

Hunters shoot (something) .
is terrible.

____.- sl------

Meaning 1

s~

/
r6

2'-...

N

V

VP

/~

VP

V

/~

I

I

/NP~

Art

I

the

shoot

N

N

I

(Someone}

NP

hunter
&

&

pl.

is &
past

terrible

progress
Meaning 2

~sl--------

/s2 ""'/\
Art

The

N

I

hunter
&

pl.

(Same}

/VP""'
V

shoot

NP

~

(something}

&

progress
Source of ambiguity:
Meaning 1:
Meaning 2:

the syntactic relationship of hunters to the
embedded sentence.
hunters is object of the verb in s 2 •
hunters is subject of the verb in s 2 •
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Stimulus sentences used in the experimental tasks.
Unambiguous sentences
The little girls had pretty new bath towels.
He was sleeping when the tornado hit.
The problem had not seemed easy in the statistics class.
You could see the elephants racing toward the jeep.
She was learning to bake cookies.
A cherry topped the sundae.
After the clown's antics Marion couldn't help laughing.
I want the new lamp and lampshade.
Johnson and Brown were the prisoners on trial.
Most little children love playing in the snow.
Surface syntactic ambiguous sentences
I was feeding her dog biscuits.
The boys ran out of the boxes.
The three masted British ships sailed south.
Friends gave her baby blankets.
You could see the animals running from the car.
Julia had never seen a real buffalo kill before.
The hostess greeted the girl with a smile.
The little girls bent old clothes hangers.
The stout major's wife waved at the ship.
Aunt Grace enjoyed telling her children stories.
Underlying syntactic ambiguous sentences
James Bond broke the window with the Russian.
Even the Russians could not stop praying.
The idea of Hitler was so awful they left the room.
The raiding of the Indians was pitiful.
Mario did not like fighting in the alley.
Aunt Hazel got me the last gift for nothing.
Dr. Emerson took the two Africans to kill them.
The shooting of the hunters was terrible.
The mayor asked the police to stop fighting.
The missionary is ready to serve.

r
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Simple semantic ambiguous sentences
Marcia bought beautiful new glasses.
The office of the president was vacant.
They always welcomed the cardinal in the springtime.
Dot's slip was embarrassing to her date.
The solution had not seemed easy in the chemistry class.
After several painful strokes he died.
A large crowd gathered to see the star.
He did not know the nickle was valuable.
Willard was not sure of the right fork.
Billy and Judy enjoyed the slides.
Complex semantic ambiguous sentences
May and Joan didn't expect to improve their figures during
the course.
John's withdrawal will result in a loss of interest.
He did not expect the paper to cover everything.
On top of everything there was a tarpaulin.
Malcolm was struck by the point.
He wears a light sweater in the summer.
The end of the game is the loss of the king.
Andy replaced the cast.
Mrs. Davis did not seem anxious to press the suit.
The author wrote the story of the year.

r
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Underlying Syntactic Ambiguous Sentence:
was so awful they left the room.
Correct Pictures:

B and D

The idea of Hitler
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A

B

C

D

Simple Lexical Ambiguous Sentence:
the star.
Correct Pictures:

A and C

A large crowd gathered to see
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Surface Syntactic Ambiguous Sentence:
boxes.
Correct Pictures:
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A and B

The boys ran out of the

..
93·

A

.. ·__,

.. , ..

B

~

..

c

Unambiguous Sentence:
Correct Picture:
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D

He was sleeping when the tornado hit.
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Complex Lexical Ambiguous Sentence:

The end of the game is

the loss of the King.
Correct Pictures:

A and B
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